Traditionally, full-backs have been associated with adding attacking impetus by advancing forward in wide areas to create overloads on the opposition full-back or wing-back.
They are often responsible for creating width for their team in the final third using wide channel runs, overlapping runs and combining with inside players to progress the ball. The modern full-back is also expected to cross the ball both in the air and along the ground.
However, during FIFA Club World Cup 2025™, a notable shift was recorded in the spaces that full-backs were occupying, the locations where they received the ball, and the time they spent on the ball when their team was in possession.
KEY OBSERVATIONS DURING CLUB WORLD CUP 2025
At the Club World Cup, full-backs:
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received the ball more often in the inside and central channels, and inside the opposition’s team shape;
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spent more time in possession of the ball, indicating increased tactical responsibility;
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had a higher proportion of distributions to wingers, whereas traditional full-backs distributed more to midfielders;
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were more involved in attacking sequences;
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had a higher distribution rate in the final third, with an increase in forward passes; and
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both finalists, Chelsea FC and Paris Saint-Germain, utilised inverted full-backs (in different ways) consistently throughout the tournament.
OFFERS TO RECEIVE AND RECEPTIONS
Inverted full-backs had a 23.1% higher proportion of receptions from offers made when located in the inside and central channels compared to FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™. They also received the ball more often, up an average of 3.8 times per 30 minutes in possession.
Teams demonstrated a keenness to centralise build-up, create midfield overloads and shorten passing connections to deep midfield pivots, while maintaining a compact and efficient rest-defence structure when attacking.
Offers to receive the ball in the inside and central channels increased by 7.7%, and receptions rose by 7.9%. The proportion of offers followed by a reception within the inside and central zones increased (9.9%) and was slightly more frequent (1.53 p30 v. 1.37 p30).
TEAM IDENTIFICATION
Of all six FIFA confederations, teams from the UEFA jurisdiction demonstrated the greatest use of inverted full-backs, playing them narrow and high during the FIFA Club World Cup 2025. Although each team had a different and distinctive tactical strategy for inverting their full-backs, both finalists — Chelsea and Paris Saint-Germain — utilised inverted full-backs consistently, as did their European counterparts, Manchester City FC and FC Bayern München.
Other teams used inverted full-backs in some games, but did not use them consistently. CF Pachuca, for example, inverted their full-backs against FC Salzburg and Real Madrid CF, but used a back-three shape in other matches. Real Madrid also experimented with this, deploying them in one match, while using the more traditional full-back structure in most of their games.
Inverted full-backs created overloads in the inner and central channels, which is why they were available to receive the ball more often. Being located narrower caused disruption to opposition defensive structures, at times forcing their defending players to leave them free and available to receive inside their opponent’s team shape. The numerical advantage they created centrally allowed them to receive the ball more often and combine with team-mates to progress it.
VARIATIONS OF FULL-BACK INVERSION
Teams demonstrated different ways of inverting full-backs, with varying focuses on how, when and where they wanted to create overloads. While the primary concept of establishing central numerical supremacy is the same, the tactical approaches are quite nuanced, catering to the individual profiles of their players. Below, we explore the consistent strategies used by Manchester City, Chelsea and Paris Saint-Germain to highlight how different the ideology can be.
Manchester City
Originating from a 1-4-3-3 concept, with one holding midfielder and two attacking midfielders, Manchester City consistently inverted both full-backs to play in the spaces either side of their defensive midfielder, while advancing to the areas occupied by their advanced midfielders. By locating both full-backs in these spaces, it drew opposition players into unexpected places and disrupted pressing triggers. This positioning also supported their structured rest defence, whereby the full-backs could recover to their more traditional out-of-possession positions quickly in the event of losing the ball.
Manchester City were patient in their build-up, allowing their full-backs to occupy central space and manoeuvre through it. As can be seen in the clip below, successive short passes gradually drew Wydad AC players out of their defensive structure in order to get pressure on the ball. Due to the presence of Manchester City’s full-backs in the central-midfield area, there were more players to press, ultimately dragging the Moroccan club’s players out of position, leaving gaps that could be exploited.
Chelsea
Tournament winners Chelsea also consistently used inverted full-backs, but in a tactically different way. In their opening match against MLS side LAFC, and playing from the basis of a 1-4-3-3 structure with two holding midfielders, Chelsea’s left full-back, Marc Cucurella, inverted high ahead of Enzo Fernández as an additional attacking midfielder in possession. When they lost the ball, Fernández recovered to the left full-back position. If Fernández advanced, Cucurella covered the holding-midfield position. To create their rest-defence structure, the right full-back tucked in alongside his centre-backs, so they maintained a 3+2 in build-up/rest defence.
A variation of this was also used in other matches, where both full-backs inverted alongside defensive midfielder Moses Caicedo, allowing Fernández to advance alongside attacking midfielder Cole Palmer, while their team rested defensively in a 2+3. This structure facilitated faster recoveries into the traditional full-back channels by both full-backs, who would be better equipped to deal with defensive 1v1s in those areas.
As can be seen in the clip below, left full-back Cucurella (3) disrupts SL Benfica’s defensive line by forcing their occupied wide right defender to come inside and leave Palmer (10) free in the channel.
Paris Saint-Germain
Tournament runners-up Paris Saint-Germain also inverted their full-backs from the basis of a 1-4-3-3 structure (with one holding midfielder), but in a more attacking way, aiming to overload their opponents’ defensive line directly. In this tactical approach, defensive midfielder Vitinha (17) dropped in alongside his two centre-backs, where he often had more time and space on the ball. PSG’s two attacking midfielders occupied the space in front, while right full-back Achraf Hakimi (2) and left full-back Nuno Mendes (25) advanced very high, playing as additional forwards when their team was building their play.
An example of this can be seen in the clip below, as both Hakimi (2) and Mendes (25) advance to take up positions directly impacting Inter Miami FC’s last line of defence, meaning they could occupy defenders and allow their forwards to get free.